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CONTRACT LAW
THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE & UCC SECTION 36-2-719
In Bishop Logging Co. v. John Deere Industrial Equipment Co.' the
South Carolina Court of Appeals held that John Deere's statements about the
future performance of its equipment in Bishop's swamp logging operation were
statements of opinion, not present fact, and thus, the statements were not
actionable under either fraud or negligent misrepresentation theories.2
Additionally, the court held that the "economic loss rule" operates in the
commercial arena. That is, when sophisticated parties carry out a transaction
governed by a contract, the rule will bar recovery in a subsequent action for
negligent misrepresentation when the damage complained of is purely
economic.3 The court also held that when a seller fails to perform its
obligation to "repair or replace" within a reasonable time according to an
exclusive limited warranty provision, it thereby deprives the buyer of a
substantial benefit of the bargain. As a result, the exclusive remedy fails of
its essential purpose, and the buyer gains a right to resort to other remedies
under the UCC.4 Finally, the court held that a separate warranty provision
excluding consequential damages will not be given independent effect when the
parties contract under the premise of "certainty of repair." The rationale is
that a seller's failure to repair or replace materially alters the balance of risks
agreed upon by the parties.5
Bishop Logging Company purchased from John Deere Industrial
Equipment Company several items of heavy equipment for use in a pioneering,
swamp logging operation.6 Despite having modified the equipment for use
in a swamp environment, John Deere extended its standard "New Equipment
Warranty" to the machinery. The warranty (1) disclaimed all other express and
implied warranties, (2) limited the remedies available to Bishop Logging to
repair or replacement of defective equipment, (3) explicitly excluded
consequential damages, and (4) did not warranty the suitability of the
equipment for any particular purpose.7
The equipment never proved satisfactory in the swamp logging operation.
Mechanical problems arose frequently, and John Deere eventually made more
1. _ S.C. -, 455 S.E.2d 183 (Ct. App. 1995).
2. Id. at _, 455 S.E.2d at 188-89.
3. Id. at , 455 S.E.2d at 189.
4. Id. at , 455 S.E.2d at 191.
5. Id. at _, 455 S.E.2d at 192-93.
6. Id. at __, 455 S.E.2d at 185-86.
7. Id. at _, 455 S.E.2d at 186, 190. The obvious implication was that the dealer had no
authority to warranty the equipment's performance in a swamp environment.
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than $110,000 in warranty repairs. John Deere was unable to effect any sort
of permanent fix. Consequently, Bishop Logging was unable to meet
production goals and sued John Deere. Bishop Logging alleged fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, and breach of express warranty.8 At trial, the
jury found against John Deere on each claim. The South Carolina Court of
Appeals reversed as to the fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims and
affirmed as to liability for breach of warranty.9
The court determined that an action for fraud did not lie because John
Deere made no representation of present fact. The statements made by John
Deere and relied on by Bishop Logging related to the expected performance
of the equipment in the swamp logging operation. Because the statements were
not susceptible to exact knowledge when made, they were mere opinion.
Therefore, the statements could not be the basis for a fraud cause of action."0
The court of appeals found that Bishop Logging improperly pleaded what
was merely a breach of warranty claim as the tort of negligent misrepresenta-
tion in an attempt to circumvent the contractual exclusion of consequential
damages. The court concluded that the tort was inapplicable to the facts of this
case because (1) the "economic loss" rule bars its application and (2) the tort
of negligent misrepresentation, like fraud, requires a representation of present
fact. 1
Despite the terms of John Deere's New Equipment Warranty, the court
of appeals determined that Bishop Logging should receive lost profits and
consequential damages for breach of an express warranty. The court concluded
that there was ample evidence for the jury to find that John Deere had been
unable to repair the equipment within a reasonable time, thereby denying
Bishop Logging the value of the bargain. Therefore, the exclusive remedy
established in the New Equipment Warranty "failed of its essential purpose" 2
under the UCC. The court then held that John Deere's inability to repair the
equipment "materially altered the balance of risk set by the parties in the
agreement."13 Thus, the separate warranty term excluding consequential
damages was properly disregarded by the lower court, and Bishop Logging
could properly recover consequential damages. 4
The economic loss rule provides that "there is no tort liability for a
product defect if the damage suffered by the plaintiff is only to the product
itself. In other words, tort liability only lies where the damage done is to other
8. Id. at, 455 S.E.2d at 185.
9. Id. at , 455 S.E.2d at 188-89, 193.
10. Id. at_, 455 S.E.2d at 186-88.
11. Id. at __, 455 S.E.2d at 187-88.
12. Id. at__, 455 S.E.2d at 191.
13. Id. at__, 455 S.E.2d at 193.
14. Id. at_, 455 S.E.2d at 193.
[Vol. 48
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss1/6
CONTRACT LAW
property or is personal injury."15 The rule "exists to assist in determining
whether contract or tort theories are applicable to a given case. "16
Application of the economic loss rule has been the subject of much
discussion in South Carolina. The current trend is to limit its use. In Kennedy
v. Columbia Lumber & Manufacturing Co. 7 the court discussed the tort
liability of a builder for construction defects when the only damage to the
purchaser was diminution in the value of the home. The court rejected
application of the economic loss rule in the commercial home building context
because it found the builder's breached duty was rooted in law.'s The court
stated: "If a builder performs construction in such a way that he violates a
contractual duty only, then his liability is only contractual. If he acts in a way
as to violate a legal duty, however, his liability is both in contract and in
tort." 19 The court indicated that "[t]he 'economic loss' rule will still apply
where duties are created solely by contract. In that situation, no cause of action
in negligence will lie. ""
In Beachwalk Villas Condominium Ass'n v. Martin3' the court held that
an architect could be held liable in tort for purely economic damage despite
the economic loss rule because he "impliedly warrants [the design's]
sufficiency for the purpose in view." The court considered this a "logical
expansion" of the rule announced in Kennedy.'
In Tommy L. Giffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones &
Goulding, Inc.' the South Carolina Supreme Court found potential liability
when a contractor sued a design engineer, in tort, for purely economic loss.
The court determined that the engineer owed a legal duty to the contractor not
to negligently design or supervise the project.24 The court stated the test for
applicability of the economic loss rule as follows:
The question, thus, is not whether the damages are physical or economic.
Rather the question of whether the plaintiff may maintain an action in tort
for purely economic loss turns on the determination of the source of the
duty plaintiff claims the defendant owed. A breach of a duty which arises
under the provisions of a contract between the parties must be redressed
15. Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 341, 384 S.E.2d 730, 734
(1989).
16. Id. at 345, 384 S.E.2d at 736.
17. Id. at 345-46, 384 S.E.2d at 737.
18. Id. at 347, 384 S.E.2d at 737.
19. Id. at 345-46, 384 S.E.2d at 737 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 347, 384 S.E.2d at 737 (emphasis added).
21. 305 S.C. 144, 146, 406 S.E.2d 372, 374 (1991).
22. Id.
23. __ S.C. _, 463 S.E.2d 85 (1995).
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under contract, and a tort action will not lie. A breach of a duty arising
independently of any contract duties between the parties, however, may
support a tort action.
In most instances, a negligence action will not lie when the parties are
in privity of contract. When, however, there is a special relationship
between the alleged tortfeasor and the injured party not arising in contract,
the breach of that duty of care will support a tort action.'
Thus, South Carolina has adopted a clear test to determine when the
economic loss rule will apply. The rule will operate to bar recovery for purely
economic loss only when the duty breached arises solely from contract. In
such a case, claimant's recovery will be limited by the contract. This seems
to leave all areas of litigation involving a disappointing product open for
application of tort principles so long as the plaintiff can allege the breach of
some legal duty.
However, in Kershaw County Board of Education v. United States
Gypsum Co.26 the South Carolina Supreme Court stated" that it had not yet
decided if the economic loss rule should be rejected in all contexts, including
the commercial arena. Thus, there seems to be room for application of the
economic loss rule in particular contexts without examining the source of the
duty owed to the plaintiff. Bishop Logging states such a rule. In cases when
(1) a product liability complaint involving the failure of a product to live up
to expectation and (2) commercial entities engaged in a transaction are
governed by a contract, the economic loss rule should be used. In such
situations, when there is only purely economic loss and no personal injury or
damage to other property, the economic loss rule bars recovery based on a
theory sounding in tort-negligent misrepresentation.27
This rule is in accord with several federal court pronouncements regarding
application of the economic loss rule in the commercial arena. In South
Carolina Electric & Gas Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.2" the district
court concluded that in "a commercial transaction governed by a contract
where the loss alleged is purely economic and the cause of action is for mere
negligent misrepresentation-the economic loss rule bars recovery for losses
that have occurred from the product's failure to live up to the purchaser's
expectations." 29 Also, in Myrtle Beach Pipeline Corp. v. Emerson Electric
Co.3" the court held that a negligence action did not lie under the economic
loss rule. The court observed a recurrent theme that when "sophisticated
25. Id. at _, 463 S.E.2d at 88 (citations omitted).
26. 302 S.C. 390, 396 S.E.2d 369 (1990).
27. Bishop Logging Co., _ S.C. at _, 455 S.E.2d at 189.
28. 826 F. Supp. 1549 (D.S.C. 1993).
29. Id. at 1557.
30. 843 F. Supp. 1027 (D.S.C. 1993), aft'd, 46 F.3d 1125 (4th Cir. 1995).
[V/ol. 48
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CONTRACT LAW
parties to a commercial transaction have negotiated a contract . and the
product injures only itself and not other property belonging to the plaintiff.
. ., contract law, specifically the Uniform Commercial Code, and not tort
law, provides the exclusive rights and remedies of the parties."31
Has Bishop Logging, although in accord with federal authority, expanded
application of the economic loss rule further than the South Carolina Supreme
Court would allow?32 Had Bishop Logging made an inquiry into the origin
of the duty allegedly breached by John Deere (negligent misrepresentation),33
it is possible that such an inquiry would have led to a finding that the duty was
rooted in law.
In Gilliland v. Elmwood Properties34 the supreme court stated that "[a]
duty to exercise reasonable care in giving information exists when the
defendant has a pecuniary interest in the transaction." The court in Gilliland
allowed a negligent misrepresentation counterclaim for purely economic loss
when Elmwood alleged that the representation induced it to enter the
contract.35 Furthermore, the court held that "neither the parol evidence rule
nor the merger or integration clause in the parties' contract prevents Elmwood
from proceeding on its negligent misrepresentation theory."3 Thus, the South
Carolina Supreme Court could hold that Bishop Logging's complaint of
negligent misrepresentation alleges a breach of a legal duty and allows a
plaintiff to puruse a tort action for purely economic harm. The court could so
hold notwithstanding the existence of a contract containing warranties and any
theory of merger or integration.37
31. Id. at 1053.
32. Unlike the South Carolina Supreme Court cases discussed above, it does not seem that
John Deere breached any legal duty arising independently from its contract with Bishop
Logging-the absence of which opens the door to application of the economic loss rule under
Kennedy, Beachwalk Villas, and Griffin Plumbing. Thus, it could be argued that nothing new was
decided. However, the court clearly stated that the basis for its rejection of Bishop Logging's
negligent misrepresentation claim rested on the economic loss rule's applicability to the facts of
the case without regard to the court's holding on the alleged misrepresentations. Bishop Logging
Co., - S.C. at _, 455 S.E.2d at 189.
33. Breach of duty seemingly is required under Kennedy, Beachwalk Villas, and Griffin
Plumbing.
34. 301 S.C. 295, 301, 391 S.E.2d 577, 580 (1990).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 302, 391 S.E.2d at 581.
37. In Bishop Logging it is true that the court found no actionable representations of present
fact. Bishop Logging Co., _ S.C. at _, 455 S.E.2d at 189. Thus, the result is correct
whether or not the economic loss rule is applied. It is future cases that make out a valid claim
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In spite of this "seamless web of proper legal analysis"38 the South
Carolina Supreme Court could simply accept application of the economic loss
rule in the commercial context of Bishop Logging. This possibility was left
open in Kershaw.9 Also, Gilliland involved a claim against a design
professional,' a member of a class offering a product distinguishable from
conventional goods,41 as did Griffin Plumbing42 and Beachwalk Villas.43
Thus, although it is good law today, Bishop Logging may well be overruled
tomorrow.
John Deere claimed that Bishop Logging could not recover consequential
damages under its express warranty claim because Bishop Logging's exclusive
remedy was limited to repair or replacement in accord with UCC section 36-2-
719(1) (a). Further, John Deere agreed that it had separately excluded
consequential damages in accord with UCC section 36-2-719(3).'
In response, the court in Bishop Logging made two distinct holdings.
First, the court held that when there is an exclusive, limited remedy providing
for repair or replacement and the seller fails to accomplish such repair or
replacement, thereby causing the buyer to lose the benefit of the bargain, then
the warranty fails of its essential purpose.45 Therefore, because John Deere
was unable to repair or replace the equipment within a reasonable time, Bishop
Logging was entitled, under UCC section 36-2-719(2),46 to pursue other
remedies under the UCC, including consequential damages.
Second, the court considered the separate exclusion of consequential
damages-pursuant to UCC section 32-2-719(3)-in the New Equipment
Warranty and applied a test to determine whether this separate exclusion is
entitled to independent effect.
Under UCC section 36-2-719(3) consequential damages are excludable
unless such exclusion would be "unconscionable."" At issue is whether a
warranty term limiting the remedy is to be considered failed under UCC
38. Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 341, 384 S.E.2d 730, 734
(1989).
39. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. It is interesting to note that in Griffin Plumbing
the court cited Bishop Logging for the proposition that "[plurely 'economic losses' may be
recoverable under a variety [of] tort theories." Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v.
Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc., _ S.C. _, _ n.2, 463 S.E.2d 85, 88 n.2 (1995). This is
despite the fact that Bishop Logging rests liability on contract under the UCC.
40. Gilliland, 301 S.C. at 298, 391 S.E.2d at 578.
41. Griffin Plumbing, _ S.C. at_, 463 S.E.2d at 89.
42. Id. at _, 463 S.E.2d at 89.
43. Beachwalk Villas Condominium Ass'n v. Martin, 305 S.C. 144, 145, 406 S.E.2d 372,
373 (1991).
44. Bishop Logging Co., _ S.C. at _, 455 S.E.2d at 190.
45. Id. at _, 455 S.E.2d at 191.
46. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-719(2) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
47. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-719(3) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
[Vol. 48
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CONTRACT LAW
section 36-2-719(2) or as standing on its own and entitled to independent
significance, thereby excluding consequential damages notwithstanding a
failure of the essential purpose of the exclusive remedy. 48 This issue is
unresolved in the state courts of South Carolina.49
Professor Henry Mather has discussed five different approaches taken by
courts in resolving this issue.5" The approaches are: (1) that the buyer is
entitled to pursue consequential damages notwithstanding the separate
exclusion; (2) that consequential damages are excluded unless the separate
exclusion is unconscionable; (3) that the buyer's recovery of consequential
damages depends on the seller's misconduct; (4) that recovery depends on the
intent of the parties, which is determined by the location of the separate
exclusion clause in the contract; and (5) that the court should make a case-
specific, facts-and-circumstances inquiry into the true intent of the parties.5"
In Bishop Logging the court held, as a matter of contract interpretation,
that the separate exclusion under UCC section 36-2-719(3) was inapplicable
to damages resulting from John Deere's failure to repair or replace within a
reasonable time. 52 The court's analysis is most consistent with the fifth
approach discussed by Professor Mather.
This interpretation is also in accord with Waters v. Massey-Ferguson,
Inc.51 In Waters the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed the recovery of
consequential damages but did not determine that the exclusion clause was part
of a failed exclusive remedy or that it was unconscionable. 54 The court
interpreted the exclusion as applicable only to damages resulting from the
defect in the product and not to damages flowing from the seller's failure to
repair or replace.5 Further, the court examined the language used in the
contract, made an inquiry into which party was responsible for drafting the
provision, and looked at the commercial context surrounding the contract's
execution.56
In Bishop Logging the court of appeals concluded that John Deere and
Bishop Logging contracted under the assumption that any mechanical defect
could be repaired or replaced. 57 John Deere's inability to repair the equip-
ment "materially altered the balance of risk set by the parties in the agree-
48. See Waters v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 775 F.2d 587, 591 (4th Cir. 1985).
49. Bishop Logging Co., _ S.C. at _, 455 S.E.2d at 192.
50. Henry Mather, Consequential Damages When Exclusive Repair Remedies Fail: Uniform
Commercial Code Section 2-719, 38 S.C. L. REV. 673 (1987).
51. Id. at 676-680.
52. Bishop Logging Co., _ S.C. at _, 455 S.E.2d at 192.
53. 775 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1985).
54. Id. at 591.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 591-92.
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ment."58 Thus, an exclusion clause applies only when the warrantor success-
fully performs its obligation to repair or replace, not when the obligation goes
unfulfilled.59
Neither Waters6° nor Bishop Logging directly addressed what some
perceive as a conflict between subsections 2 and 3 of UCC section 36-2-719.
However, by following the rational of Waters, Bishop Logging suggests that
South Carolina courts will undertake a full analysis in all cases to determine
the intent of the parties. Conceivably, South Carolina courts may always rule
on the failure of the seller to repair or replace as it relates to the parties'
intent.6' Bishop Logging suggests that, given enough evidence that the
parties' intended the buyer to bear the risk of the seller being unable to repair
or replace, a separate exclusion under UCC section 36-2-719(3) would be
given independent effect. However, if there is a direct conflict between a
failed exclusive remedy under subsection 2 and a separate limitation under
subsection 3, the law in South Carolina remains unclear.
Bishop Logging holds that the tort of negligent misrepresentation is not
an available cause of action when sophisticated entities enter into a transaction
governed by a contract that results in purely economic damage to one of the
parties. Rather, such is the exclusive domain of contract law and the UCC.
This position is arguably in tension with recent South Carolina Supreme Court
decisions indicating that the economic loss rule is not to be applied when a
duty breached by the defendant is rooted in law and not exclusively in
contract.
The court in Bishop Logging held that when (1) a seller does not repair
or replace defective goods within a reasonable time under an exclusive
warranty providing for such and (2) thereby deprives the buyer of the
substantial benefit of the bargain, the exclusive remedy has failed of its
essential purpose, and the buyer may resort to other remedies available under
the UCC. Additionally, the court made a facts-and-circumstances inquiry into
the true intent of the parties to determine whether a separate warranty
provision excluding consequential damages is to be given effect. When the
failure of the exclusive remedy materially alters the balance of risk set by the
parties, the independent exclusion does not apply to losses flowing from the
failure of the remedy and is, therefore, not entitled to independent effect.
58. Id. at 455 S.E.2d at 193.
59. Id. at __, 455 S.E.2d at 192.
60. In Waters the court expressly declined to address "the broader relationship between
[section] 36-2-719(2) and [section] 36-2-719(3)]." 775 F.2d at 591.
61. Professor Mather contends that the intent of the parties is so difficult to determine that a
rebuttable presumption is necessary to assist the courts. More precisely, Professor Mather would
place the burden on the seller to draft a warranty that evidenced an intent to give the exclusion
clause independent effect. Mather, supra note 52, at 691. Although the court adopted Professor
Mather's preferred option, the court apparently did not adopt the rebuttable presumption.
[Vol. 48
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These holdings are unprecedented in South Carolina state courts but are
in accord with recent Fourth Circuit opinions interpreting South Carolina state
law.
Bryan L. Walpole, III
9
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